Supermajority Legislative Requirements and the Constitutional Court in Chile by Sierra, Lucas
Supermajority Legislative Requirements and the  
Constitutional Court in Chile 
Lucas Sierra 
Introduction 
This piece addresses the supermajority legislative requirements in Chile and the 
constitutional jurisprudence that has developed around them. The argument takes as an 
assumption that requiring a supermajority for the passage of laws is, in principle, contrary 
to democratic ideals. This reflects the idea that democratic process cannot require, in 
principle, for a proposal to pass into law, more than half plus one of the votes that can be 
cast, that is, the votes of half plus one of the active members of the assembly delegated to 
take the legislative decision in question. Not the votes of 4/7 of the representatives as is 
required in Chile for a certain type of laws referred to as Constitutional Organic Laws 
(Leyes Orgánicas Constitucionales, henceforth LOC). The Chilean case moreover runs 
further against the idea of democracy understood as majority rule by requiring that 
modifications to any LOC passed by a 4/7 majority be subjected to the preventive 
controlabstract – of the Constitutional Court. 
 It should be emphasized that the focus is on the supermajority requirement for the 
passage of laws, not for constitutional amendments. In the latter case, supermajority 
requirements are reasonable. If the Constitution is understood as a pact made between the 
majority and minority, it does not seem misplaced to give the latter a special position in 
the negotiation. In constitutional negotiations, the basic rules of the game are defined, 




the subsidy in every round of the game, especially considering that there is a system for 
judicial review in the Constitutional Court. 
 Requiring more than half plus one of the votes to pass laws therefore implies 
giving the minority a veto power analogous to that enjoyed by the minority when 
constitutional reforms are at issue. Why? What for, if its concerns have already been 
incorporated into the Constitution? 
 Böckenförde developed a strong argument in favor of majority rule for the 
passage of laws. It is worth citing at length: 
The identification of majority rule as internally required for democracy follows 
both from the principle of freedom and the principle of self-determination, as well 
as the principle of democratic equality. For democratic freedom of participation to 
be available to all citizens, and not only for a few, the consent of the majority, at 
least, and justly, must be necessary to implement any determined substance into 
the reigning order. Requiring any less would represent a bias against those 
opposed to the motion, while requiring more than a majority would be a bias 
against those in favor. The same holds out of consideration for equality. If every 
citizen possesses the same political rights of participation, then in order for 
everyone to have the same opportunity for political influence every political 
opinion must be given equal weight. No qualitative difference, whether it be 
based on the intensity of participation in the democratic political process or on the 
old distinction in canonic law between pars sanior and pars maior, can be 
justified in this case. Assuming democratic equality, votes – from a legal 
perspective – can only be counted, not weighted (Böckenförde, 2000: 92-93). 
Therein lays the key: votes can only be counted, not weighted. The supermajority 
requirements imply weighting the votes in relation to each other, as they confer to the 
minority the possibility of vetoing motions that have majority support. Hence, for 
example, if a legislative body has 120 members and absolute majority is required to pass 
a motion, 61 votes are required. If we assume that the majority consists of 61 votes and 




less nor any greater. But if a supermajority requirement is imposed, such as one requiring 
4/7 of the votes to pass motions, then 69 votes are required, not 61. Because 61 still 
represents the majority, however, the 59 votes in the minority now count as 1.12 votes in 
the majority, that is, more than one. Likewise, the 61 majority votes now only count as 
much as 0.88 minority votes; that is, less than one. What is the grounds that justifies this 
alteration for certain legislative reforms – ones that are not constitutional in nature?1 
 The phenomenon just described is the basis of this text: the supermajority 
required to enact LOC legislation appears to be a democratic anomaly. The anomaly is 
aggravated by the fact that LOC legislation must first pass the prior review of the 
Constitutional Court (the Tribunal Constitucional, henceforth TC), whose members do 
not respond to the electorate. The practice established by the TC in the exercise of this 
task, which is analyzed below, suggests that the argument that the supermajority 
requirement is a democratic anomaly is indeed plausible. 
 To develop the argument, this paper is divided in three sections. In the first 
section, the genesis of the supermajority requirement in place in Chile is described. This 
section is subdivided into parts examining the role of the 1980 Constitution (1.1), the 
pertinent discussions of the Ortúzar Commission (1.2), the pertinent discussions in the 
State Council (1.3), and the working group that revised the final text of the 1980 
Constitution within the walls of Diego Portales (1.4). 
                                                            
1 A reflection of the democratic impertinence of the supermajority requirements for legislation, following 
Böckenförde, and with particular reference to the LOC can be found Atria (2009). One can also be found in 
Correa (2005: 740-741), with regards the jurisprudence developed by the TC over 2004. Other critiques of 
the LOC, from similar points of view, can be found in: Muñoz (2005), (2006), Aldunate (2005: 77), and 
Zapata (2008: 395-458). For uncritical and, in some cases, laudatory assessments of LOC, see: Bulnes 
(1984), (2001); Caldera (1982), De la Fuente (1991-1992), Ríos (1983), Varas (1984) y Verdugo (2009). 





 In the second section the practice that has evolved in the TC with regards the 
supermajority requirement since it began in 1981 is considered. Here the criterion for 
analysis is the manner in which the TC has conceived its competence regarding the 
legislative process when amplifying or restricting the scope of the supermajority 
requirements referred to by the Constitution when establishing the LOC. Where the court 
amplifies the scope, it demonstrates an expansive attitude. When it restricts their scope, 
its attitude is self-constrained. Returning to the fundamental argument of this paper, an 
expansive attitude aggravates the democratic anomaly, while a self-constrained attitude 
reduces it. The second section is subdivided into a quantitative description of the court’s 
actions (2.1) and an analysis of the reasoning put forward by the TC, for the purpose of 
characterizing its attitude in terms of this paper’s argument. Special emphasis will be put 
on one specific issue: the composition of personnel of organs to which the Constitution 
expressly refers with regards the LOC (2.2). 
 The third section presents, at last, the conclusion. 
1. The Rule 
 The supermajority requirement is relatively new in Chile. It was only established 
by the 1980 Constitution, which introduced for the first time a set of Constitutional 
Organic Laws (LOC) into our legal system. These are the laws that require a 
supermajority equivalent to 4/7 of the members in both chambers of Congress for 
passage.2 
                                                            




 Thus, for example, since in Chile there are 120 members of the House of 
Representatives, 61 votes comprises the absolute majority, while the 4/7 supermajority 
requirement for the LOC is 69 votes. This requirement is near the supermajority 
requirement that must be met for modifying the Constitution in Chile, which is 3/5 of 
Congress, that is, 72 votes. It might be added that there are certain constitutional issues 
that entail an even higher requirement of 2/3 – 80 votes. 
 The constitutions prior to 1980 did not have supermajority requirements. Nor did 
they exist in legislative procedures. The latter, through the rules established, required 
simple majorities. The LOC only came into being in 1980. How and why were they made 
part of our legal system? 
 To respond to this question, we must turn to the origins of the Constitution in the 
Acts of the Ortúzar Commission, which elaborated its text from 1973 to 1978, and in the 
State Council, which continued the work from 1978 to 1980. 
1.1 The Ortúzar Commission 
 The first precedent for the LOC can be found in the Commission for the Study of 
the New Constitution, or, as it is more widely known, the Ortúzar Commission, after the 
name of its President, Enrique Ortúzar. This commission was designated by the military 
junta in the days following the coup which removed Salvador Allende to prepare a new 
constitutional text. It worked from 1973 until 1978, the year in which it produced a draft 
that was sent to the State Council for consideration. 
 An air of mistrust towards the will of the people, as manifested in the treatment of 




capricious, fickle. For this reason, the entire original text of the 1980 Constitution can be 
seen as a broad effort made to contain, neutralize, or compensate for the political will of 
the majority. This mistrust materialized in different forms. Constitutional control and 
judicial review, for example, were broadened and strengthened. In addition to the 
Judiciary’s power to annul legislation that was provided in the 1925 Constitution, the 
1980 Constitution created a Constitutional Court (TC), with greater powers over 
legislation. For now, as has been mentioned, any LOC must necessarily obtain the 
approval of the TC prior to passage. 
 This is the context in which the LOC were created in the Ortúzar Commission. In 
1977, for example, Enrique Ortúzar declared: “In truth, everyone, unanimously, has 
always eagerly desired a brief Constitution that only incorporates the most fundamental 
norms. On one side, however, the experience of the former regime, the need to be on 
guard with respect citizen rights, the need to give greater strength to certain legal precepts 
in order to prevent the possibility that they might in the future become unknown … led 
the Commission … to introduce dispositions that everyone esteemed in principle perhaps 
should not be given constitutional ranking” (CO: 297 14/06/77: 350).3 
 In doing so, they turned to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France 
promulgated in 1958 under General De Gaulle. They did not, however, copy it exactly. 
They are identical with regards the regular organic-constitutional aspects and also in as 
much as they are laws that must be submitted for review of constitutionality prior to 
passage (there, by the Constitutional Council, here, by the Constitutional Court or TC). 
                                                            
3 The references to the Acts of the Ortúzar Commission are noted as follows: CO (Comisión Ortúzar): 
session number, session date: page number in the document in .pdf format accessible at the National 




But the two texts are not identical from the primary focus of this analysis, that of 
supermajority requirements. In France these laws are not subjected to supermajority 
requirements, but rather only require for passage absolute majority (half plus one of the 
voting members). 
 The Ortúzar Commission finished its work in 1978. The project for the new 
Constitution then passed to the State Council. Distrust in the electoral majority and the 
danger of delirium attributed to universal suffrage was also present in this second organ; 
sometimes even more intensely than it was in the Ortúzar Commission, as will be shown. 
1.2 The State Council 
 This body began to discuss the draft produced by the Ortúzar Commission in 
1978 and worked on it for nearly two years, until July 1980. Subsequently the text was 
given to a group that, under the auspices of the Governing Junta, worked on it intensely 
for two months, until the plebiscite of September 1980. Unfortunately this group did not 
leave behind records of its work. 
 As indicated above, the air breathed in the State Council was even more explicitly 
distrustful of the democratic majority, or, as it was commonly said, of universal suffrage. 
The words of the Council President, Jorge Alessandri, former President of the Republic, 
are only too eloquent: 
Universal suffrage has been accepted, in spite of its being considered a sacrilege 
in the birthplace of democracy. In Ancient Greeks, it was thought that the right to 
participate in the public sphere was reserved exclusively for virtuous men, a 
concept which is the antithesis of universal suffrage. When time is of essence, we 




importance are resolved by a select few. No more can be done” (CE: 56, 
28/11/78: 313).4 
It is noteworthy that in the State Council there were positions as or more opposed to 
universal suffrage. The latter position was represented by two of its members: Pedro 
Ibáñez O. and Carlos Cáceres. The former, for example, proposed: 
Avoiding as much as possible universal suffrage and attempting to keep the power 
in the orbit of the Executive and the President of the Republic, in order to furnish 
the regime with cohesion and continuity; this is the only way that political or 
public careers can be based on achievement and merit, and not on flattery, 
promises, and deceit. 
He goes on to propose an institutional framework for this: 
[N]ew systems to generate political power based on a diversification of their 
origin (different sources or colleges for the designation or election of mayors, 
representatives, senators, the President of the Republic, and the State Council); 
and a dismemberment of the systems, terms, and years in which the magistracy 
turns over in order to avoid or at least obstruct the return of partisanship” (CE: 55, 
21/11/78: 303, 307). 
Hence, the State Council maintained the requirement of an absolute majority of sitting 
representatives for the LOC (CE: 88, 04/09/79, 572). This means that, from a procedural 
point of view, the only difference between the LOC and ordinary laws was the 
requirement that LOC undergo prior constitutional review by the Constitutional Court 
(TC). The supermajority requirement, then, was created by the group that was designated 
by the Governing Junta to undertake the final revision of the draft of the new Constitution 
produced by the State Council. This comprised the truly political revision by the regime. 
                                                            
4 References to the Acts of the State Council are noted as follows: CE (Consejo de Estado): session 




1.3 The Working Group in the Diego Portales Building 
 The working group labored intensely at the headquarters of the Executive, the 
Diego Portales Building, which in 2009 became the Centro Cultural Gabriela Mistral, in 
July and August 1980, revising the text which was finally subjected to parliamentary 
approval on September 11 of the same year. Several modifications were introduced. 
Among them was the supermajority requirement for LOC, along the lines discussed by 
the Ortúzar Commission years earlier: 3/5 of voting representatives would be required to 
carry such measures. 
 This decision fit perfectly in the atmosphere of mistrust of the majority, of 
“universal suffrage,” that had permeated the entire process of constitutional revision from 
1973 until the 1980 Constitution. In truth it can be seen to represent the culmination of 
the debate over majority requirements. It is unfortunate, then, that the working group left 
no minutes or any other record of its work that would permit a more accurate 
understanding of it.5 
 The 3/5 requirement was changed in 1989. Following the 1988 plebiscite, there 
took place a constitutional reform negotiated with the opposition that had achieved 
victory in the referendum and that would form the coalition that would lead the country 
for twenty years starting in 1990, the Concertación. Among the reforms introduced in 
1989 was the reduced legislative majority requirement. Its intensity dropped a degree: 
from 3/5 to 4/7 of the voting representatives. 
                                                            




 The evolution of the supermajority requirement thus summarized, the paper will 
turn to the characterization of the practice of the Constitutional Court (TC) in respect to 
the requirement. 
2. In Practice 
 All of the decisions of the TC relevant to LOC were examined in order to 
characterize the court’s actions. The period examined begins with the decision handed 
down on November 26, 1981 and runs through TC/1704 published April 27, 2010. There 
are in all 430 decisions. They were read keeping in mind the relationship between LOC 
and ordinary laws, in order to determine whether the TC increased or decreased the scope 
of the LOC, reducing or broadening, respectively, the domain of ordinary laws. As was 
explained at the outset, if the domain of the LOC is increased, so increases the 
democratic anomaly represented by legislative supermajority requirement, whereas the 
anomaly is reduced if the domain of LOC is limited. 
 The decisions of the TC concern many different aspects of the LOC, but one 
comes up more frequently than the others: appointments to posts in public services. This 
issue provides a good indicator for the attitude of the TC, as there are two instances 
where the Constitution explicitly refers to staffing appointments as a matter of LOC: 
when it refers to the LOC concerning the Armed Forces (Articles 102 and 105) and when 
it refers to the LOC concerning the TC itself (in the final subsection of Article 92). It is 
only in the latter case that appointments are specifically mentioned: “Its organization, 
operation, and procedures will be established by constitutional organic law which will 




the Armed Forces, mention is made of requirements for incorporation into the staff, but 
not of appointments. 
 This is consistent with the fact that the general rule in matters of staff 
appointments is provided by common law. The bulk of staff appointments for State posts 
are made through legislation of the common type. That is why it is a good indicator for 
this analysis, as it provides a case for the question of how the TC has understood the 
exceptionality and limited character with which the Constitution refers to staff 
appointments. Let us look at it. 
2.1 The Initial Self-Constrained Attitude 
 The jurisprudence of the TC surrounding the LOC began with the entrance into 
force of these laws at the beginning of the 1980s, in full swing of the dictatorship. The 
first time that the TC considered them was November 26, 1981, in its decision file 
number 4.6 The TC emphasized the need for the interpreter to determine, case by case, 
the LOC character of legislative regulations. The key to do so, it added, lay in the 
“topics” that the Constitution explicitly reserved for regulation through LOC. It advanced 
a formula that would eventually become important in the jurisprudence: these matters are 
defined through the definition of two aspects: their “essential substance” and their 
“essential complementary elements.” We will return to the formula. 
 In this initial decision, the TC reaffirmed its role as interpreter of the character of 
the LOC yet, at the same time, this role was conceived in a relatively limited fashion, 
                                                            
6 From this point on, the decisions of the TC will be abbreviated to indicate the file number or section 
number in the following way: TC/number for files (rol) and C/number (considerando). This case, 




relatively self-constrained. It dealt with a projected law to partially modify the legal 
status of notaries. In Chile notaries are associated with the Judicial Branch, as auxiliaries 
in the administration of justice. The question, then, was determining whether 
constitutional disposition requiring that “the organization and attributes of the courts 
necessary for the timely and effective administration of justice over the entire territory of 
the Republic will be determined by constitutional organic law” applied in this case. If it 
was applicable, then an LOC was necessary. 
 The majority of the TC held that it was not applicable. Their argument is 
interesting: 
Without doubt the phrase “organization and attributes of courts” employed in 
Article 74 of the Constitution refers to the basic structure of the Judiciary Branch 
where it is not regulated by the Basic Charter, as it makes reference to what is 
necessary “for the timely and effective administration of justice over the entire 
territory of the Republic.” 
And then comes expression of its self-constrained attitude: 
The constituent delegate him or herself has taken it upon themself to affirm that 
not everything related to this topic falls under the scope of constitutional organic 
law, since it reserves the competence of the common law, in Article 60, No. 3, to 
regulate precepts “that are the object of codification, whether civil, commercial, 
procedural, criminal, or otherwise,” and in No. 17 of the same article leaves it to 
common law to designate the city in which the Supreme Court will hold sessions. 
(C/6) 
Further on, it reaffirms this stance: 
[I]t is obvious that not every specific task can be elevated to the category of 
essential complementary elements of constitutional organic law which regulates 




This initial self-constrained attitude towards the LOC by the TC continued for some time. 
By defining the scope of the LOC and, at the same time, its very competence in 
interpreting it, the TC elaborated a formula using potentially expansive variables: 
“essential substance” and “essential complementary” elements of the subjects designated 
in the Constitution for regulation by LOC. These include not only the nucleus of these 
subjects (their “essential substance”), but also peripheral aspects (their “essential 
complementary” elements). Yet this potentially broad formula was applied with reserve 
by its creators. 
 Another decision from the first year, TC/7, handed down in December of 1981, 
also reflected this reserved approach. Again, the subject under consideration concerned 
the Judiciary Branch: modifications were proposed to change the way writs were sent in 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. Yet again it was a matter 
– as in the case of the notaries – relatively tangential with regards the rendering of justice. 
But was it an issue that fell under the “organization and attributes of the courts that were 
necessary for the timely and effective administration of justice over the entire territory of 
the Republic,” as mandated for regulation by LOC by the Constitution? As in the 
previous case of the notaries, the majority of the TC held that it was not an issue 
requiring a LOC. Why? Because the issues requiring LOC mandate were limited to 
questions of the “basic structure” of the Judiciary, which implicitly affirmed that aspects 
unrelated to basic structure, such as the regulations for notaries and the distribution of 
writs, were matters for the common law, not the LOC (C/10). 
 Things would change, however. Early on the TC also begins to display signs that 




the common law, was not one that was entirely established. An interpretive criterion 
which has been called “dismemberment” is one of those signs. 
2.2 “Dismemberment” 
 On December 22, 1981, on the heels of the decision just discussed, the Court 
handed down another decision – TC/22 – that would have expansive consequences with 
regards its competence in matters of LOC. With this decision the TC embarked on a path 
that has been, rightfully, criticized in the literature, especially by Buchheister and Soto 
(2005): the path of “dismemberment” of the LOC. 
 “Dismemberment” can be contrasted with the “unity” of the LOC. The unity of 
constitutional organic laws arises from conceiving of these normative standards as closed 
bodies. That is to say that the subjects requiring LOC regulation must be determined by 
one sole authoritative text, in one single normative unity. Dismemberment, however, 
supposes the possibility that the same authoritative text might contain legislation 
requiring LOC control and legislation reverting to the common law. 
 The TC itself had preached the unity of the LOC in its decision TC/7 of 
December 22, 1981, stating that the objective of the LOC, “is developing in a harmonized 
and systematic text the constitutional precepts in those areas that the constituent assembly 
designated for such laws” (C/8). But before going much further, in decision TC/10, the 
court removed any possibility of “a harmonized and systematic text,” declaring: 
That this Court refrain from addressing the transitory third article of the project 
[…] for, in accordance with the second subsection of the second transitory 
disposition of the Constitution, the matter in question is not subject to 




Hence, by taking a position with respect to a legislative body regarding subjects that the 
Constitutions states pertain to LOC – in this case, mining concessions – the TC accepted 
the Governing Junta’s decision in the sense that said body contained dispositions that 
were not of LOC character. Subsequently it also came to pass that some dispositions 
requiring LOC treatment were identified or inserted into normative bodies comprised for 
the greater part of common law dispositions. 
 “Dismemberment,” the interpretive criterion that allowed dispositions reverting to 
LOC to be mixed in with dispositions of ordinary law, facilitates the adoption of an 
expansive attitude by the TC, as it makes it possible for the court to intervene in a very 
broad range of activities of legislative power. 
 And so it was that in 1985 the TC displayed an expansive approach that it would 
maintain until 1992. One effect was the decision TC/33 of September 24, 1985, which 
address the LOC project regarding the Electoral Court. 
2.3 Towards an Expansive Approach by the TC 
 This decision was very important and it is not easy, unlike in other cases, to 
criticize the expansive attitude that can be observed in it, as the attitude adopted by the 
majority of the TC was operative in the process of democratic restoration. The decision 
remains, notwithstanding, ironic in the sense that, in accordance with the thesis of this 
analysis, by adopting a more expansive attitude the TC raises the degree of democratic 





 Obeying closely the wording of the Transitory Dispositions 11 and 27 of the 1980 
Constitution, the Governing Junta had proposed an LOC project for the Electoral Court, 
which it kept apart from the plebiscite that would take place on October 5, 1988 to 
determine whether Pinochet would remain in power or if free elections would be held. In 
accordance with the criteria of the Governing Junta and the text of the transitory 
constitutional dispositions just mentioned, the plebiscite was not to be carried out 
following the permanent norms of electoral certification established by the Constitution, 
specifically in Articles 18, 84, 85, and 86. 
 Transitory Disposition 11 stated: “Article 84 of the Constitution relative to the 
Electoral Court, will commence its activities on the date determined by the respective 
law, on occasion of the first election of senators and representatives, and its members 
must be designated thirty days in advance of this date.” 
 This means that the Electoral Court would not be in operation until after the 1988 
plebiscite. Yet the majority of the TC formed a systematic interpretation and, based on 
that interpretation, held that the following use of the word “law” in Transitory 
Disposition 27 (.., was not to be understood as an ordinary law, but rather as part of the 
LOC referred to in Article 18 of the Constitution for a “public electoral system”: “The 
plebiscite must take place not less than thirty nor more than sixty days after the 
corresponding proposition and will be carried out in accordance with the law.” This is 
how the TC put it in its decision TC/33: 
This “law” to which the cited disposition refers is, without doubt, the 
constitutional organic law referred to in Article 18 of the Basic Charter, given that 




must be carried out in all of the aspects that are not established by the 
Constitution. (C/13) 
The TC thus enlarged the scope of matters pertaining to LOC. In the project there were 
also dispositions regarding personnel appointments. No one objected at their being 
considered LOC and the matter ended there. 
 This way, however, the TC, with its expansive approach to LOC, also forced the 
crucial plebiscite of October 5, 1988 to be carried out under the auspices of a functioning 
Electoral Court and the guarantees that derived from it, such as free access to television 
advertising time reserved for political campaigning. There can be no doubt that this 
played a part in carrying out a clean election and peaceful return to democracy. The 
court’s decision in the case is thus understandably difficult to criticize. 
 One year later, in 1986, the TC maintained its expansive approach in decisions 
that, unlike TC/33, are easier to criticize. This is the case of decision TC/38, handed 
down on September 8, 1986, and mentioned earlier in this paper. In it, the TC uses the 
distinction between “essential substance” and “essential complementary elements” drawn 
in the previous decision TC/4 in 1981 in order to specify which matters mentioned in the 
Constitution reverted to LOC. Unlike its previous decisions, however, in which the idea 
of “essential complementary element” was applied restrictively, in this decision the TC 
applies it in an expansive manner, extending it to the appointment of personnel in the 
Electoral Service. Specifically, a matter that was typically subject to ordinary law, such 
as the personnel regulations for public organs, became in 1986, with decision TC/38, a 




That to conclude in the manner indicated in the previous paragraph, this Court 
considered the character of Article 18 of the Constitution special in determining 
that the organization and operation of the public electoral system and the manner 
by which the election and plebiscite processes will be carried out, in every aspect 
not predetermined by the Constitution, to be a matter of constitutional organic 
law, a precept that expresses the will of the constituent assembly that the law in 
question have constitutional organic standing not only in its essential nucleus but 
also in those aspects which comprise its essential complement, even though such 
aspects, considered separately, are proper to the common law. (C/5) 
The TC recognized, then, that as a general rule or, as it put it, “considered separately,” 
personnel regulations are a matter of ordinary law. The regulation of the personnel of the 
public electoral system mentioned in the Constitution, however, is a matter for LOC. Put 
otherwise, something as internal, as associated to the everyday operation of a public 
organ, as is the matter of who staffs it, must be determined in detail through the 
supermajority process of the LOC. The decision was sustained in the following way: 
That, having proven that the norms that regulate the Electoral Service are a matter 
of constitutional organic law, it must be accepted that so are the norms that 
regulate its personnel, since this determines the level of staffing needed for the 
operation of the organization. Separating these issues and supposing that the Basic 
Charter reserved for constitutional organic law the question of the legal regime 
regulating the Electoral Service and for the common law the question of the 
personnel who support it would mean subordinating the efficacy of a 
constitutional organic law to the discretion of the common law, since nothing 
would be gained by having a complete legal structure for the Service if, at the 
same time, it lacked the adequate personnel to carry out its purpose. (C/32) 
On November 18, 1986, in decision TC/41, the TC reaffirmed its opinion that personnel 
regulations for the Electoral Service was a matter of LOC. Six years later, however, in 
1992, the TC changed it in that personnel regulations for organs to which the Constitution 
alludes in reference to a LOC were now considered a matter of LOC. 
 It should be mentioned that the Constitution refers to different organs with 




makes to the organization and operation of the public electoral system and the manner in 
which elections and plebiscites are carried out, “in every aspect not predetermined by the 
Consititution,” can be understood as particularly intense, justifying the conclusion that 
the regulation of personnel employed by the public electoral system be a matter for LOC. 
Here, however, Article 92 of the Constitution should be examined. It determines that the 
LOC of the TC itself should include the “staff regulations” of the court. This disposition 
should set the tone for the intensity of the court’s treatment, in the sense that when the 
Constitution wants personnel issues to be a matter for LOC, it says so explicitly. When 
the Constitution does not say so explicitly, as in the case of all the other references to 
matters of LOC, then it should be understood that the issue in question is a matter of 
common law. 
 Returning to the jurisprudence, the expansive approach of the TC that began in 
1985 was interrupted in 1992 with the reappearance of a self-constrained attitude. 
2.4 The Return to a Self-Constrained Attitude in 1992 
 The decision that marked the return is TC/160, handed down on September 30, 
1992. The case was a special one, for it addressed a requirement formulated by the 
government that is not obligatorily subject to prior review by the TC. In this case, the 
government raised a question of constitutionality during the processing stages of a bill 
that made staffing modifications to the General Comptroller’s office. Congress deemed 
the proposed law to be a LOC, but the government opposed the qualification and brought 
a request to the TC for consideration. The TC sided with the government, qualifying the 




TC/38 from 1986 and TC/33 from 1985 that formed an inverse, expansive, precedent. 
How did it do this? 
 The court argued that the nature of the decisions TC/38 and TC/33 was 
exceptional due to the exceptional character of the electoral system and the manner in 
which it is consecrated by the Constitution. The precedent set in 1985 and 1986 thus 
circumvented, the TC adopted the self-constrained approach that has been observed in its 
first decisions. To restrict the applicability of LOC to issues of personnel and staffing, the 
court held: 
That it is for this reason that when the Constitution ascribes the organization and 
operation of a Government Branch or of an autonomous organism to 
constitutional organic law, the organic legislators cannot take on or intervene in 
all of the details that this supposes, and must limit themselves to outlining the 
basic or fundamental structure of those institutions in order to attain expeditious 
functioning order in practice. (C/10) 
In order for a law to have LOC character, the TC concluded, there has to have been an 
explicit declaration of such in the constitutional text. If there is not any, it is assumed that 
the matter reverts to ordinary law, not LOC. The TC thus reversed its precedent. One year 
later, in 1993, the majority of the TC held to this approach in decision TC/171. 
 This decision addressed a bill that would create Local Police Courts in several 
districts. Congress sent almost the entire bill for constitutional review as a LOC. Yet the 
majority of the TC held that several of its dispositions were not a matter of LOC (such as 
one that regulated the courts’ shifts), since they did not involve the “basic structure” of 





 Moreover, the TC seemed to remain committed to the new, more self-constrained 
precedent which resembled its first decisions but had been displaced by the expansive 
precedent established from around 1985 onward. Decision TC/255 of May 20, 1997 
clearly demonstrates the self-limiting manner in which, at that time, the TC viewed its 
task with regards LOC. 
 In this case, the TC faced a bill which sought to improve the compensation of 
certain professionals in the field of education. Congress requested it carry out the prior 
review germane to LOC. The TC refused to review the bill because it considered its 
properties to be outside the ambit of LOC, even though it touched the issue of 
municipalities (the professionals in question were teachers in municipal schools), a 
category that does revert to LOC. It refused to issue an opinion regarding the bill’s 
constitutionality as it esteemed that the bill was not a matter for LOC. 
 The TC also displayed this self-constrained attitude in other decisions in 1997. 
One was TC/257 (September 2, 1997). Congress sent a bill for review that concerned job 
training and employment. One of its dispositions created an Office of Labor Information 
in municipalities, which is referred to in the Constitution as a matter for LOC. The TC, 
however, did not consider the new department to form part of the issues proper to LOC. 
 Two years later, concerning a LOC bill that established the Public Ministry, the 
TC reiterated its commitment to a self-constrained approach and a quite limited vision of 
the scope of LOC. The decision in question is TC/293 from September 22, 1999: 
[…] that the norms of interpretation employed must be taken up prudently, 
because in some fashion they necessarily lead us to expand the scope of the 




by the Constitution, given that doing so would deprive our legal system of a 
balanced and suitable flexibility, in view of the supermajority requirement that is 
necessary for approving, modifying, or repealing this category of laws. (C/7) 
The self-constrained approach reflected in these decisions reemerges quite visibly a 
decade later. In decision TC/270, handed down on January 26, 2007, with regards the bill 
that created the 14th Region in Chile, Los Ríos, and the Province of Ranco (Chile now 
counts 15 regions, which are subdivided into Provinces), the TC held that personnel 
regulations for some of the organs, which the Constitution considers matter for LOC, 
were beyond the scope of these laws: they were held to be questions of ordinary law. The 
argument was by then well known: 
That Article 6 of the bill in question, which modifies the structure of personnel in 
the Electoral Service, does not regard the subjects indicated by Article 18 of the 
Political Constitution as under the ambit of constitutional organic law and, 
therefore, is not proper to that law. (C/18) 
Notwithstanding, in 2008 and 2009 the TC once again gave indication that the expansive 
approach remains intact, with decisions concerning the staffing of the Electoral Service. 
2.5 Yet the Expansive Approach Persists 
 Decision TC/1135, handed down on May 27, 2008, took up the bill that created 
positions in the Regional Management of the Electoral Service in the Arica y Parinacota 
Region and established norms concerning political parties in the newly created regions of 
the country. The TC did not hesitate to qualify its dispositions as matters of LOC: 
That Law 18.583 that determines the staffing of the Electoral Service was 
approved with the status of constitutional organic law. For this reason, article 1 of 
the bill under examination, by proposing modification to article 1 of that 




It repeated the same argument in decision TC/1508, handed down on October 27, 2009. 
What is interesting about that decision is the minority opinion that advocated a less 
expansive approach for the TC in matter of LOC. This minority of judges is in favor of 
readopting the stance of the court in its first years, the posture that changed in 1985 with 
decisions TC/33 and TC/38, and was then recuperated in 1992 with TC/160, once 
democracy had been consolidated. This minority referred to the expansive approach as 
“obsolete” jurisprudence: 
That we consider that reasons exist for changing the outcome of decision TC/38 
and, therefore, for holding the matter of the bill under examination as proper to 
common law. In the first place, because the decision TC/38 corresponds to a 
period of Constitutional Court jurisprudence that is now found to be obsolete. 
(C/3) 
Is this jurisprudence really, now, obsolete? 
3. Conclusion 
 It most likely is not obsolete. In any case, this paper concludes with the 
suggestion that the ideal solution is eliminating LOC from Chile’s legal system, so that 
only majority rule is all that is necessary for legislative action. A simple majority and, if 
esteemed necessary for matters deemed especially sensitive, an absolute majority, that is, 
half plus one of the representatives in office. Never again supermajority requirements to 
pass a law, only to change the Constitution. By eliminating the LOC the abstract but 
obligatory prior review by the TC that still exists would be eliminated, leaving in place 
only posterior, voluntary, concrete judicial review. In this way the democratic anomaly of 
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The LOC in Chile cover: 
 
1. The Central Bank of Chile. 
2. The General Bases of State Administration. 
3. Police Forces. 
4. Mining concessions. 
5. The National Congress. 
6. The Regional Development Councils. 
7. The General Comptroller of the Republic. 
8. The Court Statutory Code. 
9. Education. 
10. Establishes the General Law for Education. 
11. Constitutional states of exception. 
12. The Armed Forces. 
13. Government and Regional Administration. 
14. Electoral inscriptions and the Electoral Service. 
15. Electoral Service staffing. 
16. The Public Ministry. 
17. Municipalities. 
18. Political parties. 
19. Electoral courts. 
20. The Constitutional Court. 
21. Popular Elections and Vote Counting. 
